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Abstract—Cryptography and data science research grew exponential with the internet boom.
Legacy encryption techniques force users to make a trade-off between usability, convenience,
and security. Encryption makes valuable data inaccessible, as it needs to be decrypted each time
to perform any operation. Billions of dollars could be saved, and millions of people could benefit
from cryptography methods that don’t compromise between usability, convenience, and security.
Homomorphic encryption is one such paradigm that allows running arbitrary operations on
encrypted data. It enables us to run any sophisticated machine learning algorithm without
access to the underlying raw data. Thus, homomorphic learning provides the ability to gain
insights from sensitive data that has been neglected due to various governmental and
organization privacy rules.
In this paper, we trace back the ideas of homomorphic learning formally posed by Ronald L.
Rivest and Len Alderman as “Can we compute upon encrypted data?” in their 1978 paper [1].
Then we gradually follow the ideas sprouting in the brilliant minds of Shafi Goldwasser, Kristin
Lauter, Dan Bonch, Tomas Sander, Donald Beaver, and Craig Gentry to address that vital
question. It took more than 30 years of collective effort to finally find the answer “yes” to that
important question.
HOMOMORPHIC learning is a cryptographic
“holy grail” that allows a worker to perform
arbitrary computations on client-encrypted data,
without learning anything about the data itself. In
simple terms, homomorphic learning is where a
data owner wants to send data up to the cloud for
processing but does not trust a service provider
with their critical data. Using a homomorphic
encryption scheme, the data owner encrypts their
data and sends it to the server. The server per-
forms the relevant computations on the data with-
out ever decrypting it and sends the encrypted
results to the data owner. The data owner is the
only one able to decrypt the results since they
alone have the secret key. Figure 1 shows a simple
diagram that depicts the whole process involved
in homomorphic learning. The paragraph below
illustrates a few motivating examples of homo-
morphic learning.
Internet companies like Google, Facebook,
and Amazon, along with healthcare companies
like Accumen, AccuPoint, and Cigna collect huge
amounts of data from users. Internet companies
use sophisticated machine learning algorithms
to learn patterns from the rich set of data and
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Figure 1. A simple system processing the user’s
sensitive information using homomorphic learning.
provide innovative user-focused services. Health-
care companies and government organizations are
lagging behind others to mine the tons of data that
could benefit millions of users and save billions
of dollars due to strict privacy and data protection
rules such as CCPA, GDPR, HIPPA, and FERPA.
Homomorphic learning might be one way for
these companies to mine sensitive data without
violating privacy and data protection laws.
Recently, the Dutch broadcaster VRT re-
port [2] uncovered that the smart speakers (Ama-
zon Echo, Google Home) are eavesdropping to
every conversation even when not activated, and
google employees are systematically listening to
these recordings. Google spokesman said, “This
work is of crucial importance to develop tech-
nologies sustaining products such as Google As-
sistant.” Homomorphic learning might be key for
these companies in the future to improve AI
technologies without access to the raw data.
There is an unprecedented amount of data
breaches happening these days. But not every
breach comes about as the result of outside at-
tackers. There are other threat models to consider.
Insider threats and privileged access account for
about 35% to 60% of breaches, according to
industry reports. Although the data collected by
the companies is stored in the encrypted database
using standard encryption (private key cryptogra-
phy), the database administrators and developers
still have access to all of the data. Tragically
the raw data is released with the help of these
private keys in the event of a data breach. Since
homomorphic encryption allows learning without
decrypting the data, there is no need for private
keys. Thus, the use of homomorphic encryption
could help to reduce data breaches.
Homomorphic learning holds big promises
for secure data storage and manipulation. It is
far off from an efficient real-world enterprise
implementation, but there has been substantial
progress in the homomorphic learning area, such
as secure multi-party computation and federation
learning. It is both captivating and illuminating to
witness the progress happening in this area. This
paper tells the story of homomorphic learning:
the web of people and ideas associated with it.
Our story will begin from the time when Rivest
asked the question “Can we compute upon en-
crypted data?” to “fully homomorphic encryption
for machine learning” [3]. Before describing the
great question, we are going on a short detour to
describe the history of modern cryptography.
A Brief History of Cryptography
There are historical records that the ancient
civilization of the Incans, Aztecs, Greeks, and
Romans practiced cryptography. Pieces of evi-
dence suggest that their practice of cryptography
was elementary. Though rudimentary cryptogra-
phy was widely practiced until the seventeenth
century, there were no formal tools to analyze
the cryptography methods.
Johann Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777 - 1855),
who had exceptional influence in many fields
of mathematics and science, wrote an important
statement about prime numbers which later be-
came the foundation of modern cryptography. At
the age of 21, in his famous book, “Disquisitions
Aritmeticae” he wrote, “The problem of distin-
guishing prime numbers from composite numbers
and of resolving the latter into their prime factors
is known to be one of the most important and
useful in arithmetic.” Most of modern cryptogra-
phy is built on these two problems: finding if a
given number is prime, and resolving composite
numbers into their prime factors.
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The significant revolution in cryptography
started with the World War, as the war introduced
a qualitative change in patterns of communica-
tion. Radio communication was most popular
during the war as the signals could be trans-
mitted to very long distances. It could be used
to give orders, convey strategies, and so on, but
the enemy could easily intercept the line and
discover what their strategies were. So this pitfall
of radio provided a very strong demand for the
use of cryptography. During World War II, special
computing machines were used for cryptography.
The Germans in particular had the famous enigma
machine to encipher their messages. Alan Tur-
ing and others who had familiarity with notions
of computation broke these ciphers, which had
a significant impact on the war. The war was
arguably shortened by several years because of
these cryptographic breakthroughs.
Modern cryptography was only limited to
military and government secret organizations, be-
fore the publication of David Kahn’s book “The
Codebreakers - The Story of Secret Writing” [4].
This book inspired general masses and lots of
modern-day cryptographers, including Rivest, to
become interested in the field. The NSA (National
Security Agency), tried to suppress publication of
the book because it brought attention to the field,
and had a lot of interesting technical detail. But
Kahn went ahead and published it anyway. He
has updated the book since to include more recent
developments.
Alan Turing was highly influential in the
development of theoretical computer science, and
one of his major contributions was to show that
some class of problems were unsolvable on any
computer; but then there were other classes of
interesting problems which seem solvable in prin-
ciple, but take a lot of time to solve. Thus he
developed the theory of computational complex-
ity. The problems in cryptography usually fall
in the second class. So the hard problems are
important for cryptography. Cryptographers want
the problem to be very hard for the adversary to
solve.
Ralph Merkle, Marty Hellman, and Whit
Diffie revolutionized cryptography by formalizing
the idea of public-key cryptography in the paper
“New Directions on Cryptography” [5]. Public-
key cryptography was a marvelous idea which is
qualitatively different notion than classical cryp-
tography, because it separates the public key and
the private key.
The idea of public-key cryptography was on
its way. Everybody would have a public key,
and they could use that public key to encrypt a
message. The public key would do the encryption,
and a separate key (private) would do the decryp-
tion. Having these two keys be different supported
by the notion of computational difficulty, made
public-key cryptography secure. The core idea
of public-key cryptography was that publishing
one of the keys shouldn’t reveal the other, and
it should be computationally hard to figure out
the secret key given the public key. So somebody
could tell us the public key, and we wouldn’t be
able to figure out the secret key.
The invention of the worldwide web, just like
Marconi’s invention of the radio, made cryptog-
raphy essential and drove the demand for cryp-
tography.
RSA’s Dream
RSA (RivestShamirAdleman) is one of the
most popular public-key cryptosystems and is
widely used for secure data transmission. Ronal
Linn Rivest is one of the authors of the RSA [6]
paper that introduced a public-key cryptosystem.
He grew up in Niskayuna, New York, a suburb
of Schenectady, New York where he attended
public school. He graduated from Niskayuna
High School in 1965. He received a B.A. in
Mathematics from Yale University in 1969. The
David Kahn’s book “The Codebreakers - The
Story of Secret Writing” [4] made him interested
in cryptography during his undergraduate days.
During his Ph.D., he briefly worked in the
area of Artificial Intelligence, but soon realized
that his real passion was for mathematics and
theoretical computer science. He received a Ph.D.
in Computer Science from Stanford University
in 1974. His Ph.D. research was mainly on the
analysis of associative retrieval algorithms [7]
under supervisor Professor Robert Floyd. After
appointment as a faculty in the Department of
Computer Science at MIT, we are fortunate that
he got a chance to communicate with Ralph
Merkle, Marty Hellman, and Whit Diffie about
public-key cryptography. Their paper “New Di-
rections on Cryptography” [5] had a long-lasting
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Figure 2. Computer scientist who first thought about
privacy homomorphism. From left to right: Ronal Linn
Rivest, Len Adleman, and Mike Dertouzos
impact on Rivest that inspired him to work with
Shamir and Adleman to formulate RSA in their
seminal paper “A method for obtaining digital
signatures and public-key cryptosystems” [6].
With the success of public-key cryptosystems,
Rivest was dreaming about doing computations
with encrypted data. So just after the publica-
tion of their seminal paper, Len Adleman and
Ronal Linn had a fruitful discussion with Mike
Dertouzos, who was the Director of the MIT
Laboratory for Computer Science (LCS). During
the discussion they asked him the, “Can we
compute upon encrypted data? Can we work
with data that’s been encrypted piece by piece and
combine the pieces while leaving them encrypted
so we can end up taking two ciphertexts, combine
them, and end up with a new ciphertext in such
a way that the underlying plain text for that
new ciphertext is the appropriate operation on the
underlying plain text?”
They found out that one way of answering
their question was with a process called homo-
morphism, and they dreamed of a cryptosystem
that’s homomorphic. They imagined a cryptosys-
tem with a sufficiently rich set of operations,
that supports arbitrary computations on encrypted
data. But they had no idea on how to pursue this
dream. They get credit for asking this important
question: but they didn’t solve it. They formally
asked this question in their paper “On data banks
and privacy homomorphisms” [1]. They defined
the term “privacy homomorphism” as a special
encryption function which permits encrypted data
to be operated on without preliminary decryption
of the operands, for many sets of interesting
operations.
The “privacy homomorphism” idea developed
in their famous paper was borrowed from math-
ematics. Homomorphic is an adjective that de-
scribes something of the same or similar form.
Specifically, in algebra, a homomorphism is a
structure-preserving map between two algebraic
structures of the same type (such as two groups,
two rings, or two vector spaces).
Spring Break
The question Rivest et al. [1] asked in 1978
about computation on encrypted data was way
ahead of its time. It was too abstruse to be
answered as a whole with the current state of
research in cryptography. There was a long si-
lence in the research community. It felt like the
researchers were on a long spring vacation. Every
four/five years, sporadically, a few researchers
would pursue somewhat related topics to “privacy
homomorphism”. It took more than thirty years
for the community to catch up with the question.
During this “spring break”, Shafi Goldwasser
was one of the prominent researchers who for-
malized vital ideas like probabilistic encryption
and zero-knowledge interactive proofs. Her paper
on probabilistic encryption was responsible for
turning encryption from an art to a science, and
allowing better security in the internet age [8].
Furthermore, she worked on a paper on zero-
knowledge interactive proofs [9], which makes it
possible to prove a statement or concept without
revealing any new information. These ideas were
not directly applicable to answer the question
posed by Rivest el al. [1], but it was a powerful
tool for cryptographers to peek into the formalism
of cryptography. Shafi Goldwasser was honored
with the Turing Award, the highest honor in
computer science, for her work in revolutionizing
the field of cryptography.
The story about how Goldwasser got inter-
ested in computer science is both inspiring and
fascinating for all the women in STEM. She was
born in 1959 in New York City. Her parents were
Israeli, and her joint American/Israeli citizenship
presaged the two countries that would play such
an important role in her research. Her family
returned to Israel, where Shafi attended grade
school in Tel Aviv. In high school, she was
especially interested in physics, mathematics, and
literature. After her schooling, she returned to the
U.S. and became an undergraduate in the mathe-
matics department at Carnegie Mellon University
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(CMU). One computer science course that she
especially remembers, taught by Jon Bentley, was
an algorithms and discrete math course that she
loved. Soon, however, she became interested in
programming (which she had never done before)
and computer science. She also worked on the
CM* project at CMU, a 50-processor multipro-
cessor system. Shafi next had a summer internship
at the RAND Corporation in Los Angeles that
cemented her love for computer science.
Her interest in cryptography came a little late.
After completing her undergraduate in 1979, she
went on a vacation to California and decided to
enroll in graduate school in computer science at
the University of California, Berkeley, without
knowing what she wanted to study. Her interac-
tion with some of the computer scientists (Silvio
Micali, Eric Bach, Manuel Blum, and others)
during her graduate years in Berkeley initiated
some interest in theoretical computer science,
especially cryptography.
The first problem Shafi began working on
with Micali was how to hide partial information
in “mental poker” [8]. Their solution was an
essentially perfect way of encrypting a single bit
(against a computationally limited adversary), and
they invented a “hybrid” technique to show that
independently encrypting individual bits causes
the whole message to be secure. These proof were
precursors to the proofs required for the theory of
homomorphic encryption.
After finishing up her Ph.D. from Berkeley,
Shafi joined M.I.T. It was an exciting time when
she came to M.I.T, as Ron Rivest, Micali, and
Mike Sipser were still there. With Goldreich
and Micali [10], Shafi investigated whether
the notion of a pseudorandom number generator
could be generalized so that one could gener-
ate exponentially many bits (or equivalently, a
function) pseudorandomly. This definition was in
itself important, and is why we understand today
what it means for a block cipher such as AES
to be secure. They also showed how to prov-
ably transform a pseudorandom number generator
into a pseudorandom function generator. These
ideas had applications to the (then) new field of
Learning Theory, providing examples of things
that cannot be learned. These ideas were equally
applicable to homomorphic encryption to show
that the ciphertext didn’t reveal any information
about the raw data.
After working for a few years on “Probabilis-
tic encryption” and “pseudorandom functions”,
her interest shifted towards Number theory [11].
It took decades for her to return to homomorphic
learning. Just after Shafi switched her interests
around 1995, Josh Daniel Cohen Benaloh came
to the scene. In his Ph.D. dissertation “Verifi-
able secret-ballot elections” [12], he developed
theoretical tools and proofs for ensuring that the
privacy of the voters remains intact though all
communications are made public. He described
a practical scheme for conducting secret-ballot
elections in which the outcome of an election
can be verified by all participants and even
by non-participating observers. The theoretical
tools developed for the secret-ballot election were
equally applicable to allow a prover to convince
verifiers that either statement A or statement B
is true without revealing substantial information.
His method of secret sharing homomorphisms
enabled the computation of shared (secret) data
and presented with a method of distribution of
shares of secret such that each shareholder can
verify the validity of all shares.
Again, there were a few years of silence after
the publication of Josh Benaloh’s Ph.D. disser-
tation before the publication of “Non-interactive
crypto computing” [13] paper by Tomos Sander.
Sander’s paper focused on this classical prob-
lem:
Alice has an input x and Bob has function c. Alice
should learn the value of C(x) but nothing else
substantial about C. Bob should learn nothing
else substantial about Alice’s input x.
This problem can be viewed as computing over
encrypted data where the parties do not engage
in additional communication. Tomas Sander et
al. [13] introduced a new protocol for secure
evaluation of functions in polynomial time. The
protocol involved one party sending encrypted
input to a second party (crypto computer), which
evaluates the input securely, and provides the
output to the input party without learning the un-
derlying function within a single round. This new
protocol allowed the computation of logical AND
operation using the encrypted data. Moreover,
this scheme was homomorphic over a semigroup
(instead of a group), thus expanding the range of
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Figure 3. Fully homomorphic encryption pioneers.
From left to right: Shafi Goldwasser, Dan Boneh, and
Craig Gentry
algebraic structures that can be encrypted homo-
morphically. This was a huge accomplishment.
Their protocol allowed some limited number of
operations on the encrypted data.
Just one year after the publication of
“Non-interactive crypto computing” [13], Don-
ald Beaver extended the protocol developed by
Tomas Sander’s team to include non-deterministic
log-space functions [14]. Moreover, Beaver intro-
duced novel parallelization techniques to reduce
the sub-computations on the functions to constant
time complexity. This made the computation on
the encrypted data faster, with reduced latency.
It took almost five years for another promising
result. Dan Boneh, a Professor of the Com-
puter Science Department at Stanford Univer-
sity published a landmark paper titled “Evalu-
ating 2-DNF formulas on ciphertexts”. In this
paper, they presented a homomorphic public-
key encryption scheme, that allowed the public
evaluation of a 2-DNF formula (Φ) on boolean
variables (x1, x2, . . . , xn), given the encryption
(cyphertexts) of those boolean variables.
In other words, their formulation allowed the
evaluation of quadratic multivariate polynomials
on ciphertext, provided the resulting value was
within a small set. This formulation had the
following major benefits: 1) it reduced the total
number of communications required, 2) it facili-
tated the construction of a viable election system
without the need of zero-knowledge proofs, and
3) it provided a protocol for universally verifiable
computation. This was a keystone towards a plau-
sible implementation of homomorphic learning.
Dan Boneh then recruited a graduate student
named Craig Gentry to extend their homomorphic
scheme.
The Promised Prince
Craig Gentry appeared as the promised prince
to fulfill a prophecy of making the dream of a
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) a reality.
He worked with the Gdel Prize-winning Stanford
Professor Dan Boneh and Turing award winner
Shafi Goldwasser to come up with the first viable
FHE scheme. In 2009, he published a plausible
candidate construction of a fully homomorphic
encryption [15] scheme, answering the problem
posed in 1978 by Rivest and thought by many to
be impossible to resolve.
FHE makes it possible to perform arbitrary
computations (mathematical operations like sum
or product as well as more complicated opera-
tions) on encrypted data and without needing a se-
cret key, and while keeping the individual pieces
of data hidden and secure [15]. For example, a
web application could prepare an individuals tax
return using her encrypted financial information,
without seeing any data in the raw form. Although
FHE is not yet efficient enough for widespread
implementation, Gentry’s breakthrough has initi-
ated a surge of new research globally in computer
science as it has enormous implications for mak-
ing the cloud computing environment more secure
and compatible with data privacy for individuals.
The path followed by Gentry to develop an
FHE scheme started with viewing RSA encryp-
tion as multiplicatively homomorphic: i.e, given
an RSA public key and ciphertexts, one can
efficiently compute a temporary ciphertext that
encrypts the product of the original plain-texts.
So, RSA is homomorphic concerning multiplica-
tive operators. The encryption scheme that is
homomorphic with any operator would enable
arbitrary computation on encrypted data without
the decryption key.
The fully homomorphic encryption
scheme [15] developed by Gentry is tied to
a somewhat homomorphic scheme. His doctorate
work shows that if the somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme is “bootstrappable”, then a
fully homomorphic encryption scheme can be
built from it. Suppose there is an encryption
scheme with a “noise parameter” (n) attached
to each ciphertext. The noise parameter can
be viewed as the random variable used in the
encryption scheme, which generates different
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ciphertexts for the same raw text. The decryption
works as long as the noise is less than some
threshold N >> n. Furthermore, imagine if
we have algorithms Add and Mult that can
take ciphertexts E(a) and E(b) and compute
E(a + b) and E(a ∗ b), but at the cost of
adding or multiplying the noise parameters. This
immediately gives a “somewhat homomorphic”
encryption scheme that can handle functions of
depth roughly (log logN − log log n).
Now suppose that we have an algorithm Re-
crypt that takes a ciphertext E(a) with noise
N ′ < N and outputs a fresh ciphertext E(a) that
also encrypts a, but which has noise parameter
smaller than
√
N . This Recrypt algorithm is
enough to construct a fully homomorphic scheme
out of the somewhat homomorphic one. In his
paper, the somewhat homomorphic encryption
scheme is modified so that its decryption function
has multiplicative depth at most (log logN −
log log n − 1) i.e., less depth than what the
scheme can handle. The somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme that has this self-referential
property of being able to handle functions that are
deeper than its own decryption function is known
as “bootstrappable”, and thus the somewhat ho-
momorphic scheme which is “bootstrappable” is
fully homomorphic.
To get a feel for the actual working of the
homomorphic scheme, let’s go into details about a
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme on a
toy problem. Let’s look at a secret key encryption
scheme which uses integers. The key is an odd
integer p > 2N . An encryption of a bit b is
simply a random multiple of p, plus a random
integer B with the same parity as b, i.e B is even
if b = 0 and is odd if b = 1. More concretely,
the ciphertext is
c = b + 2x + kp,
where x is a random integer in range
(−n/2, n/2), and k is an integer chosen
from some range. Then we can decrypt the
ciphertext by setting
b← (cmod p)mod 2,
where (cmod p) is the “noise parameter” in this
scheme, which will be in the range [−n, n].
Decryption would work correctly as long as
(b + 2x) ∈ [−N,N ].
Figure 4. The encryption process for a simple homo-
morphic encryption scheme.
Let’s take a concrete example and show
that the simple homomorphic encryption scheme
works. Suppose we want to encrypt the user’s
current balance on their account and find the total
amount for all the users using the homomorphic
encryption scheme for integers. Let the user’s
balance be represented by b1, b2, . . . , bn. Specif-
ically, let
b1 = 3, b2 = 4, b3 = 5
and its corresponding binary representations are
b1 = 00011, b2 = 00100, b3 = 00101
respectively. Let the private key be p = 5. Then
[−N,N ] ⊂ (−p/2, p/2). Let k be 2, which is
inside the range (−p/2, p/2). Let x be a random
integer inside [−1, 1].
Figure 4 describes how the cyphertext is gen-
erated for the integers. The integers are converted
to binary and then encrypted using the cypher-
text generating equation. The resulting ciphertexts
can be operated on using any operator. For our
example, we add the cyphertexts. The resulting
cyphertext from the addition can be decrypted.
Figure 5 shows the process of decryption of
the augmented cyphertext. The result of decrypt-
ing the augmented cyphertext is the same as
the addition of the raw text. Thus, the simple
homomorphic encryption scheme preserved the
addition operation when applied to the cyphertext.
This toy example shows that the simple en-
cryption is homomorphic when N >> n and
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Figure 5. The decryption process for a simple ho-
momorphic encryption scheme after the cyphertext
obtained from encryption has been added.
valid for +, ∗ operators. For these encryption
schemes to be useful in the real world, we need
fully homomorphic encryption that can operate on
any arbitrary operators in a reasonable amount of
time. Gentry’s FHE supports arbitrary operators,
at least in theory.
Gentry used the lattice-based approach in
his doctorate dissertation to describe the first
plausible construction for a fully homomorphic
encryption scheme. His original cryptosystem re-
ported the timing of about 30 minutes per basic
bit operation, which is way too slow for real-
world applications. Over the years, with extensive
design and implementation work, the results have
improved by many orders of magnitude.
In 2010, Marten van Dijk, Craig Gentry, Shai
Halevi, and Vinod Viakuntanathan [16] presented
a second fully homomorphic encryption scheme
based on the Gentry’s construction that doesn’t
require ideal lattices. They showed that the ideal
lattices could be replaced by a very simple some-
what homomorphic scheme that uses integers.
This scheme was conceptually simpler than Gen-
try’s ideal lattice scheme, but had similar proper-
ties with regards to homomorphic operations and
efficiency.
Gentry went on to tackle another longstand-
ing open problem, moving beyond cryptographic
bilinear maps (which have been used widely in
encryption, cryptographic digital signatures, and
key agreement) to multilinear maps. He and his
collaborators were the first to publish a plausible
candidate multilinear map. In 2013, he and his
colleagues leveraged those findings to present the
first example of cryptographic software obfus-
cation, a discovery that is paving the way for
the encryption of entire programs while keeping
their functionality intact, thereby making it infea-
sible to reverse engineer the program [17]. This
is one solid practical example of homomorphic
encryption. He is inspiring not only a flood of
practical applications but also opening doors for
new intellectual pursuits across the whole of
cryptography.
The Opensource Factory
The publication of Gentry’s doctorate dis-
sertation in 2009 made the fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) a buzz word. Still, FHE was
not computationally efficient to be applied to
real-world applications. Over the last few years,
with extensive research and opensource tools like
Seal [18], Palisade [19], HElib [20] and others
started to change the landscape of the homomor-
phic encryption. The integration of these tools
into popular Machine Learning libraries such as
TensorFlow and PyTorch enabled amateurs and
researches alike to build applications focused on
privacy. These opensource tools are responsible
for the homomorphic encryption to reach the
masses. Still, only a few specialized companies
provide homomorphic learning as a service to
healthcare and government organizations, and it
might take a few more years for homomorphic
learning to be ubiquitous among the cloud service
providers.
Secure multi-party computation, differential
privacy, and federated learning are the popular
form of privacy-focused learning. In 2018/2019,
there were more than ten privacy-focused learning
library released as open-source software. Secure
multi-party computation is all about computing
a function jointly by different parties over their
inputs while keeping those inputs private. Shafi,
with Yael Tauman Kalai and Guy Rothblum,
introduced [21] one practical formulation of
secure multi-party computation, and showed how
to efficiently delegate the computation of small-
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depth functions to the untrusted “cloud”.
Differential privacy addresses the paradox of
learning nothing about an individual while learn-
ing useful information about a population. In gen-
eral, differential privacy is not an algorithm but a
definition that outlines ways to perform privacy-
preserving data analysis [22]. In a simplified
differential privacy model of computation, we
assume the existence of a trusted and trustworthy
curator who holds the data of individuals in a
database D, typically comprised of some number
n of rows, and each row contains the data of
a single individual. The differential privacy goal
employs a mechanism to simultaneously protect
every individual row while permitting statisti-
cal analysis of the database as a whole. This
mechanism is an algorithm that takes as input a
database, the set of all possible database rows,
random bits, and a set of queries, and produces an
output string. The output string can be decoded to
produce relatively accurate answers to the queries
without revealing the information of the individ-
uals. Tang et al. [23] combined homomorphic
encryption with differential privacy to create a
novel privacy-preserving algorithm Heda to train
an ML classifier on the UCI ML datasets [24].
Federated learning is a distributed architecture
for learning a predictive model using decentral-
ized mobile devices or servers, keeping the local
data samples private, and only publishing the
learned updates to the central server using ho-
momorphic encryption. Federated learning allows
for personalization, scaled deployment of models,
lower latency, and less power consumption, all
while ensuring data privacy and security. One
popular success example of federated learning is
the “Gboard on Android” (the Google Keyboard).
When the Gboard shows a suggested query, it is
using federated learning on the history on-device
and updating it based on whether you clicked the
suggestion or not [25].
Currently, there are a few frameworks like
PySyft [26] and HE Transformer [27] that al-
low the users to perform homomorphic learn-
ing with Neural Network models on encrypted
data. These frameworks decouple private data
from model training using Federated Learning,
Differential Privacy, and Multi-Party computation
(MPC) within the main deep learning frameworks
like PyTorch and TensorFlow.
One of the influential people who is taking the
responsibility of developing opensource tools for
integrating fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
and ML libraries is Andrew Trask. He is a re-
searcher pursuing a Doctorate at Oxford Univer-
sity, where he focuses on Deep Learning with an
emphasis on human language. Dowlin et al. [28]
were the first to train a neural network model
on encrypted MNIST data with high throughput
and accuracy using the SEAL [18] library for
homomorphic encryption. Hesamifard et al. [29]
trained a deep neural network over encrypted
MNIST and CIFAR data with high efficiency and
accuracy. Badawi [30] et al. trained the first ho-
momorphic convolution neural network (HCNN)
on encrypted data with Graphics Processing Unit
(GPU)s. All previous approaches before HCNN
ran only on the CPU. HCNN is truly remarkable,
as it achieved the high-security level and great
classification accuracy for MNIST and CIFAR.
For the machine learning enthusiasts and
practitioners, homomorphic learning provides an
exciting opportunity to democratize AI, and a
privacy-focused way to solve large-scale ML
problems. Homomorphic learning is a nascent
field with lots of hope and promises, eagerly
waiting for next Craig Gentry to revolutionize the
field.
CONCLUSION
This article described a brief history on the de-
velopment of homomorphic encryption schemes,
highlighting the collective contributions of a co-
hort of brilliant minds. It took more than thirty
years of communal effort to find a theoretical
answer to the question “Can we compute upon
encrypted data?” posed by Rivest et al [1]. It
took another ten years to develop efficient ho-
momorphic encryption frameworks that could be
coupled with other machine learning libraries.
Multi-party computation and federated learning
aided with homomorphic encryption have already
started making a powerful impact on privacy-
focused machine learning communities. It might
still take a few years before homomorphic learn-
ing is ubiquitous.
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